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INTRODUCTION 
Day broke, Wednesday, November 4, 2020, following the election 
between Donald Trump and Joseph Biden, with a country unsure of who had 
won the presidency.  In several states, early results recorded President Trump 
ahead, while later-tabulated votes from Democratic strongholds chipped 
away at his lead.1  Although experts predicted this scenario, many Trump 
supporters believed the election was being stolen through massive, 
coordinated voter fraud.2  They believed this, in large part, due to the 
 
*  Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law.  This Article was prepared for the Symposium 
entitled Toward Our 60th Presidential Election, hosted by the Fordham Law Review on 
February 26, 2021, at Fordham University School of Law.  I am grateful to more colleagues 
than I can accurately identify.  Nonetheless, I am especially grateful to Michelle Adams, 
Bernadette Atuahene, Stephanos Bibas, Richard Bierschbach, Guy-Uriel Charles, Adam 
Kolber, and the faculties of Brooklyn Law School, Chicago-Kent College of Law and the 
University of Michigan Law School for their critiques and comments which vastly improved 
my efforts.  My heartfelt thanks to the staff members and student editors of the Fordham Law 
Review for their diligence, skill, and patience. 
 
 1. See Alexander Burns & Jonathan Martin, As America Awaits a Winner, Trump Falsely 
Claims He Prevailed, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/04/ 
us/politics/election-trump-biden-recap.html [https://perma.cc/DWP8-78S7]. 
 2. See, e.g., Miles Parks, If There’s No Election Night Winner, Don’t Panic, NPR, at 
00:15 (Oct. 20, 2020, 10:41 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/10/20/925563057/it-might-not-
be-clear-who-won-on-election-night-but-that-may-not-mean-a-problem 
[https://perma.cc/W2HE-6NZC]. 
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unprecedented explicit undermining of election results by President Trump 
himself.3 
In the midst of this volatile landscape, groups of Trump supporters, 
sometimes numbering in the hundreds and, at times, armed with 
military-style rifles, descended on election offices in African American–
dominated urban areas, demanding that vote counting be stopped or changed 
and threatening violence to vote counters.4  In Detroit, chaos erupted as 
Trump supporters exceeded the number of permitted challengers, refused to 
leave election offices, and pounded on windows and doors.5  Two days later, 
two hundred protesters, some armed, returned to protest outside the tally 
room at the TCF Center in Detroit.6  Similar scenes unfolded in 
Philadelphia7; Maricopa County, Arizona;8 and Atlanta.9  The images of 
furious white “protestors” banging on windows, intimidating Black election 
workers as they tried to count Black votes, were searing. 
It is tempting to note the unique circumstances surrounding these scenes:  
a bitterly divided country, an international pandemic, and a president openly 
trafficking in election conspiracies.  Those who are skeptical of race as 
determinative of the American experience will doubt that these protests were 
driven by the racial makeup of cities like Detroit, Atlanta, and Philadelphia, 
among others.  For these individuals, the simpler explanation is that boiling 
partisan temperatures caused Trump supporters to target populous 
Democratic strongholds.10  There is no reason, the argument goes, to leap 
 
 3. See Burns & Martin, supra note 1; Nicholas Kristof, Opinion, When a President 
Sabotages His Own Country, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 
11/04/opinion/donald-trump-election-2020.html [https://perma.cc/Y7RT-A5QB]. 
 4. See Omar Abdel-Baqui et al., Protesters Rally at TCF Center as Biden’s Lead 
Overtakes Trump in Key States, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Nov. 6, 2020, 8:51 PM), 
https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2020/11/06/protesters-rally-tcf-
center-detroit-biden-ballots/6186881002/ [https://perma.cc/2WXN-AEV8]. 
 5. See Tresa Baldas et al., Chaos Erupts at TCF Center as Republican Vote Challengers 
Cry Foul in Detroit, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Nov. 4, 2020, 9:12 PM), 
https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/11/04/tcf-center-challengers-
detroit-michigan/6164715002/ [https://perma.cc/EBY8-6HXD]. 
 6. See Abdel-Baqui et al., supra note 4. 
 7. See CBS3 Staff, Tensions Brewing Outside Pennsylvania Convention Center Between 




 8. See Chris Pleasance & Frances Mulraney, Arizona Polling Center Is Forced to CLOSE 
as Armed Trump Supporters Lay Siege—While Republicans Launch Legal Challenges in 
Michigan, Wisconsin and Georgia and Counting Continues with Biden Needing Two More 
Contested States to Declare Victory, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 5, 2020, 10:39 AM), 
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8915559/Could-Arizona-flip-TRUMP-State-
reveals-600-000-votes-counted.html [https://perma.cc/3KSG-5L2B]. 
 9. See Nomaan Merchant & Tim Sullivan, Election Officials Worried by Threats and 
Protesters, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 6, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/arrests-vote-count-
oregon-new-york-f92075a34ce8dd166ff17bbd9bedc49d [https://perma.cc/VV28-RWVD]. 
 10. This argument, captured in what is largely known as “the structural turn” in voting 
rights, is more fully explored in infra text accompanying notes 58–61. 
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from the partisan explanation to the conclusion that protestors set out to 
suppress votes because they were cast by Black voters. 
But, for so many Black Americans, these doubts are nearly impossible to 
credit.  This skepticism misunderstands the nature of racial animus regularly 
expressed in elections.  Indeed, partisan motivations need not be absent, and 
racial animus need not be self-conscious or explicit.  Rather, partisan 
impulses are refracted through racial animus and suspicions that are usually 
unthought; arguments that would never be forwarded are regularly accepted 
when Black voters are the subject.11  Legislative attempts to ban “Souls to 
the Polls” movements are considered justified.12  For example, the continued 
disenfranchisement of wide swathes of former felons, despite its obvious 
racist history and present effects, is ignored.13  Political operatives remain 
convinced that Black votes are the appropriate object of their partisan 
suspicions, whatever their self-conscious motivations.14  As The New York 
Times noted in discussing the contestation of votes in Detroit: 
Perhaps nowhere was the targeting of Black votes more explicit than in 
Wayne County, Mich., home to Detroit . . . .  In initially resisting the 
certification of Wayne County’s votes, one of the Republican board 
members, Monica Palmer, said she was willing to certify every 
municipality in the county except Detroit, even though some cities, like the 
largely white Livonia, had worse irregularities.15 
I am certainly among those who harbor no doubt that voters’ race in 
Detroit, Atlanta, and Philadelphia, for example, was crucial to the rejection 
of vote counts coming out of those cities.  The entire set piece is part of a 
much more durable American disease.16  Once, violence stopped Black 
Americans from voting; today, contemporary variations attempt to stop 
Black votes from being counted.17  Common to both phenomena is a 
 
 11. For an extended discussion about how social meaning shapes the meaning of certain 
actions, see infra text accompanying notes 234–39. 
 12. See Paul M. Schwartz, Voting Technology and Democracy, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 625, 
647 (2002); Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase:  Electronic Voting and Democratic 
Values, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1743 (2005). 
 13. See 13TH (Netflix 2016); Ekow N. Yankah, Good Guys and Bad Guys:  Punishing 
Character, Equality and the Irrelevance of Moral Character to Criminal Punishment, 25 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1019, 1029–33 (2004); Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”:  The Ideological 
Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 
1059–61.  See generally George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment:  Reflections 
on the Racial Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895 (1999). 
 14. See Jim Rutenberg & Nick Corasaniti, Republicans Rewrite an Old Playbook on 
Disenfranchising Black Americans, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/22/us/politics/trump-republicans-black-voters.html 
[https://perma.cc/DZ7M-6SAJ]. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See generally CAROL ANDERSON, ONE PERSON, NO VOTE:  HOW VOTER SUPPRESSION 
IS DESTROYING OUR DEMOCRACY (2018). 
 17. See Ari Berman, Jim Crow Killed Voting Rights for Generations.  Now the GOP Is 
Repeating History., MOTHER JONES (June 2, 2021), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/ 
2021/06/jim-crow-killed-voting-rights-for-generations-now-the-gop-is-repeating-history/ 
[https://perma.cc/8F3N-8KNU]; Brandon Tensley, America’s Long History of Black Voter 
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fundamental belief in the illegitimacy of Black political power; the sense that 
there is something inherently suspect when Black voters sway political 
leadership.  Suspicion may be couched in vague assertions of voter fraud,18 
but it always targets the Black vote.19  By contrast, mass armed protests 
rejecting votes from the nearby liberal enclave Ann Arbor borders on 
unthinkable.20 
Protesting Black votes is part of our history of rejecting Black Americans 
as legitimate wielders of political power and contesting the fullness of Black 
citizenship.21  Obviously, hostility toward viewing Black Americans as 
deserving of the rights owed to other Americans is present in nearly every 
aspect of American life.  But, among the oldest and most contentious 
hostilities—from the Civil War to Reconstruction to the Civil Rights 
Movement to contemporary voter suppression efforts—has been the 
resistance against Black votes.  Any opportunity to quell this locus of racial 
animus calls for urgent address.  Particularly, at this moment, when 
long-standing prophylactic measures such as the Voting Rights Act of 196522 
(VRA) are being dismantled, a permanent solution to Black 
disenfranchisement, its material costs, and its symbolic harm, should be 
pressing. 
One simple, if not (politically) easy, solution beckons.  Notwithstanding 
sporadic academic attention, compulsory voting and its connection to Black 
citizenship has not, to my knowledge, been explored in legal literature.  The 
possible effects of compulsory voting on political inequality, particularly 
 
Suppression, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2021/05/politics/black-voting-rights-
suppression-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/AF3A-GYZ2] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 18. See generally ANDERSON, supra note 16.  One person interviewed was convinced, 
without evidence, that “[t]here’s obvious voter fraud, and it’s coming out of the larger 
Democratic-run cities . . .  Atlanta is one them.”  Merchant & Sullivan, supra note 9.  This 
opinion was offered by a businessman visiting Atlanta, who was convinced the election was 
being stolen. See id. 
 19. See generally Tensley, supra note 17. 
 20. Obviously, there are other reasons why urban areas attract more attention, including 
population and, perhaps, being nearer to protesters.  Yet, this hardly explains it all, as 
evidenced by the reports of those who travelled long distances to disrupt voting, including a 
woman driving from Syracuse, New York, to Detroit. See Abdel-Baqui et al., supra note 4.  
Nor does this explain the strength of the intuition that Ann Arbor would be simply out of 
bounds for such contestation.  In any case, that this is part of a historic pattern of contesting 
Black political power can hardly be doubted.  For example: 
Mayor Tom Barrett of Milwaukee noted in an interview that Mr. Trump was 
hyper-focused on his city, which is about 39 percent Black and 19 percent Latino, 
and not on the predominantly white and Republican-leaning suburbs outside it, 
which had the same regulations that the Trump campaign was challenging in 
Milwaukee. 
Rutenberg & Corasaniti, supra note 14. 
 21. See generally J. Morgan Kousser, Suffrage, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN 
POLITICAL HISTORY:  STUDIES OF THE PRINCIPAL MOVEMENTS AND IDEAS 1236 (Jack P. Greene 
ed., 1984). 
 22. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 52 
U.S.C.). 
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across wealth and class, have been intermittently examined.23  Scholars who 
have argued for compulsory voting have also noted the potential material 
effects of compulsory voting on minority communities, in passing.24  But, 
the important symbolic antidote that compulsory voting offers to the history 
of racist attacks on Black voting remains unexplored. 
Despite my conviction that race is central to explaining why certain votes 
are still systematically contested, the proposal for compulsory voting has 
another important feature:  even for those who are skeptical of the role that 
race plays in modern voter suppression, compulsory voting ameliorates other 
democratic problems of inequality, as well.  For example, low voter turnout 
threatens democratic legitimacy by imposing minority rule by the few 
wealthy and educated.25  Further, even if one does not view race as a 
motivating factor in contemporary voting problems, there is no doubt that the 
history of racist voter suppression has cast a modern-day shadow and that 
many of our current voting controversies impose disproportionate costs on 
communities of color.26  Indeed, compulsory voting holds the promise of 
addressing even internal, self-negating voting deformations within these 
communities.  Compulsory voting addresses political inequalities of class, 
income, and race, and, in doing so, presents an important way forward.  Thus, 
even without agreement on the racial motivation behind election 
contestation, compulsory voting offers important attractions. 
A world in which every citizen is legally obligated to vote addresses a slew 
of democratic ailments.  Nowhere would it change more than by permanently 
foreclosing an entire line of attack on Black citizenship.  While I address a 
few necessary programmatic and doctrinal features, I do not pretend to 
provide a blueprint for a new government agency.  Rather, my goal is to 
address common philosophical counterarguments and provide normative 
motivation for universal compulsory voting by illustrating its potential to 
cure the lasting racial vulnerability surrounding Black citizenship. 
This Article proceeds in five parts.  Part I briefly outlines the historical 
contestation of Black Americans’ voting.  Part II explores the promise of 
compulsory voting for shoring up democratic legitimacy.  Part III imagines 
how a regime of compulsory voting would ameliorate modern attacks on 
Black suffrage.  Part IV summarizes the distinctive philosophical connection 
between voting and political belonging.  Part V takes up the heart of the 
argument, that compulsory voting would not only address a slew of 
democratic ails but also, most importantly, play a decisive role in quelling 
the historical contestation of Black citizenship.  The conclusion follows. 
 
 23. For a classic, see generally Arend Lijphart, Unequal Participation:  Democracy’s 
Unresolved Dilemma, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 (1997). 
 24. Id. at 1–3. 
 25. See infra text accompanying notes 108–11. 
 26. See, e.g., infra notes 155–59 and accompanying text. 
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I.  THE CONTESTATION OF BLACK FRANCHISE 
The American tale of the Black franchise is well known in its outline.  
There was little question about suffrage for African slaves in colonial 
America.27  Slavery is the quintessential state of political inferiority and 
exclusion.  Importantly, American slavery was more than just a juridical 
concept; harkening back to Aristotelian concepts, Black slaves were 
considered intrinsically inferior and naturally subservient.28 
Recall that, in the late 1800s, citizenship and voting were not yet 
inextricable.29  Yet, it was clear to many that for “negroes” to claim political 
equality, the franchise was a necessary marker; none other than Frederick 
Douglass argued that slavery would not be truly abolished unless Black men 
could vote.30  The struggle for Black freedom and a measure of civic equality 
culminated in the Civil War and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 
It is an obvious understatement to note that the struggle to legitimate Black 
(male) voting did not conclude with the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.31  Despite the constitutional prohibition on racial 
disenfranchisement, the Fifteenth Amendment left states wide discretion to 
craft other distinctions; for example, white supremacist political structures 
responded by disenfranchising Black citizens, using proxies like literacy 
tests, property restrictions, poll taxes, pauper restrictions, and various 
registration procedures.32  These voting restrictions also excluded large 
numbers of ordinary white voters and immigrants, though some of these 
effects were mitigated by grandfather clauses.33  As Alabama Senator John 
 
 27. While the condition and cruelty of slavery was itself decisive, any question of 
citizenship was decided in the infamous Dred Scott decision. See generally Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 28. Though, natural subservience was also thought to exist alongside natural treachery. 
See Ariela Gross, Pandora’s Box:  Slave Character on Trial in the Antebellum Deep South,  
7 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 267, 270–78 (1995).  The threat of slaves and former slaves as 
inherently driven to rape white women was a particularly widespread trope. See J. Dickson 
Bruns, Address to the White League of New Orleans 5 (September 14, 1875). 
 29. See infra notes 188–207 and accompanying text. 
 30. See FREDERICK DOUGLASS, 4 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 167 
(Philip S. Foner ed., 1955). 
 31. A part of the tumultuous road to Black suffrage was its relationship to women’s 
suffrage.  Some prominent leaders, including Susan B. Anthony, held that suffrage was a 
universal right. See Reva Siegel, She The People:  The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, 
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 948, 989 n.125 (2002).  Others, out of racist 
contempt or cynical political calculation, thought women’s suffrage was best advanced by 
opposing voting rights for African Americans. See id. at 985 n.110.  Subsequently, many 
women’s suffrage leaders felt deeply betrayed at a political compromise that granted Black 
men the right to vote but not women. See id. at 984–85; AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF 
THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1890–1920, at 163–65 (1965); Richard L. Hasen & Leah 
M. Litman, Thin and Thick Conceptions of the Nineteenth Amendment Right to Vote and 
Congress’s Power to Enforce It, 108 GEO. L.J. 27, 43–44 (2020). 
 32. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE:  THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 105–71 (2000); STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS:  
VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944–1969, at 11–12 (1976). 
 33. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 270–71 (1939); R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the 
Mark:  Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 851–53 (2004); 
KEYSSAR, supra note 32, at 145–46; Dayna L. Cunningham, Who Are to Be the Electors?:  A 
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T. Morgan famously wrote, the mere participation of negroes, surely 
brimming with hatred, would sully and ultimately destroy democracy.34 
Alongside “legal” efforts to disenfranchise Black voters were waves of 
violence and terror aimed at stripping Black Americans of their personal, 
economic, and political power.35  White southerners, in particular, reacted to 
the abolition of slavery and the enfranchisement of Black men by forming 
the Ku Klux Klan (“the Klan”) and engaging in violent vigilantism to 
suppress Black aspirations, including through hooded night rides, cross 
burnings, beatings, branding, and mutilations and killings of terrified Black 
citizens, all of which sought to redraw the color line the war had erased.36  It 
is nearly impossible to estimate accurately the scale of violence inflicted by 
the Klan, with estimates ranging up to 50,000 killed during this time.37  Even 
accurate numbers would not reflect the pervasive threat of violence on every 
aspect of Black life.38  While the Klan targeted all aspects of Black social 
progress, intimidating Black voting was at the core of its mission.39  Indeed, 
armed Klansmen often surrounded polling places.40 
Despite federal law enforcement’s eventual suppression of the Klan 
between 1871 and 1872, violent resistance to Black voting continued.  For 
example, the “White League,” a white supremacist rifle club, used Klan-style 
violence to kill Black community leaders attempting to vote.41  In short, 
white vigilantes, particularly, but not only, in the South, made clear that 
Black votes were viewed as illegitimate.42  The fundamental basis of this 
 
Reflection on the History of Voter Registration in the United States, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
370, 380–88 (1991). 
 34. See Senator John T. Morgan, The Race Question in the United States, in THE ARENA 
385, 390 (1890). 
 35. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:  AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–
1877, at 425–44 (1988); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865–1877, at 
201–04 (1965); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Colorblindness, Race Neutrality, and Voting Rights, 
51 EMORY L.J. 1397, 1418–19 (2002); Andrew F. Lang, Republicanism, Race, and 
Reconstruction:  The Ethos of Military Occupation in Civil War America, 4 J. CIV. WAR ERA 
559, 582–83 (2014).  See generally MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, PRESERVING THE CONSTITUTION:  
ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA, ch. 8 (2006). 
 36. See ALLEN W. TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR:  THE KU KLUX KLAN CONSPIRACY AND 
SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION 29–30 (1971); Jared A. Goldstein, The Klan’s Constitution, 9 
ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 285, 295–97 (2018).  See generally Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Colored 
Speech:  Cross Burnings, Epistemics, and Triumph of the Crits?, 93 GEO. L.J. 575 (2005). 
 37. See generally JOHN EDWARD BRUCE, THE BLOOD RED RECORD:  A REVIEW OF THE 
HORRIBLE LYNCHINGS AND BURNING OF NEGROES BY CIVILIZED WHITE MEN IN THE UNITED 
STATES, AS TAKEN FROM THE RECORDS 20 (1901). 
 38. ASHRAF H.A. RUSHDY, AMERICAN LYNCHING 61 (2012).  Professor Lisa Cook 
elaborates on how spectacular racial violence carried out in any one location then reverberated 
across the country, discouraging Black economic and scientific accomplishment.  See Lisa D. 
Cook, Violence and Economic Activity:  Evidence from African-American Patents, 1870–
1940, 19 J. ECON. GROWTH 221 (2014). 
 39. See generally TRELEASE, supra note 36. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See FONER, supra note 35, at 558–62. 
 42. See Michael Kent Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment:  Recalling What the Court 
Forgot, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 911, 956–57 (2008); William W. Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth 
Amendment, the “Right” to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 
SUP. CT. REV. 33, 45–47. 
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view was that the American Constitution and its fundamental political 
structure was the province of white people; in other words, Black people were 
not truly capable of being political equals, their participation robbed white 
people of their rightful political power, and their votes sullied the American 
political project.43 
The end of Reconstruction essentially ceded the South to the forces of 
white supremacy.44  In 1896, Plessy v. Ferguson45 ushered in an era of 
formalized “separate but equal,” establishing the Jim Crow South.46  Black 
efforts at franchise, whether individually or collectively, resulted in violence 
and death not only in the South but also throughout the country, and Black 
Americans understood that political ambition, like economic or social 
ambition, could raise white ire and violence at any moment.47 
This rejection of the Black right to vote occurred simultaneously with the 
near universalization of suffrage and its increasing association with “true 
citizenship.”48  The adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, granting 
women the right to vote, strengthened the link between voting and equality 
in the American political imagination.49  Because negroes were formally 
American citizens, the Black vote could not be denied without undermining 
the ideal of voting as a citizen’s inherent right.50  Thus, passionate rejection 
of Black voting had to be ostensibly consistent with the universal right to 
vote; voting restrictions were not the de jure voting restrictions of the past 
but rather took the form of onerous and arbitrary registration requirements, 
poll taxes, “citizenship tests,” voter roll purges, and felon 
disenfranchisement.51  Such methods did not entirely stop Black Americans 
from voting but rather sharply curtailed Black political power.  And, as iconic 
scenes of the civil rights era remind us, both vigilante and state violence were 
 
 43. See Goldstein, supra note 36, at 301–02. 
 44. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, State’s Rites, Last Rites, and 
Voting Rights, 47 CONN. L. REV. 481, 514–19 (2014). 
 45. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).  To be sure, segregation existed before this ruling—most 
notably, in northern cities. 
 46. Id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 47. Of course, the omnipresent threat of violence had long been a deep part of Southern 
slave culture. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & LOREN SCHWENINGER, RUNAWAY SLAVES:  REBELS 
ON THE PLANTATION 42–48, 239–40, 251–52 (2000); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR 
INSTITUTION:  SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 174–79, 186–87 (1969).  This continued 
after emancipation. See EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE:  CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH-CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH 161 (1984); Lisa Cardyn, Sexualized 
Racism/Gendered Violence:  Outraging the Body Politic in the Reconstruction South, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 675, 690, 700–06 (2002).  For a greater discussion about the widely felt effects 
of the threat of violence on Black flourishing, see generally Cook, supra note 38. 
 48. See Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 IND. L.J. 
1289, 1348–50 (2011). 
 49. See Siegel, supra note 31; Hasen & Litman, supra note 31, at 46–47. 
 50. See Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM:  EXAMINING 
THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25, 37–38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994). 
 51. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, 
FREE AT LAST TO VOTE:  THE ALABAMA ORIGINS OF THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT 43 (2007); 
Fishkin, supra note 48, at 1346–49; Jane S. Schacter, Unenumerated Democracy:  Lessons 
from the Right to Vote, 9 J. CONST. L. 457, 462–64 (2007). 
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always at the ready if proxy methods failed, and Black communities 
attempted mass political mobilization. 
Thus, the key battles of the civil rights era included the substantive, not 
just de jure, enfranchisement of the Black vote and the defeat of nearly all 
restrictions on voting.52  In our popular imagination, this struggle culminated 
in the Twenty-Fourth Amendment53—which banned poll taxes—and the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965.54  The expansion of the VRA in the following 
decade, providing nationwide coverage by the U.S. Department of Justice to 
fight against discriminatory voting practices, seemed to draw the curtain on 
our national history of undermining the Black vote.55  With the notable, 
racially barbed exception of felon disenfranchisement, the grand battles over 
the legitimacy of the Black vote seemed to be in America’s past.  Indeed, in 
signing the 1975 extension of the VRA, President Gerald Ford did not even 
mention the long struggle to secure Black voting rights and, instead, only 
affirmed universal voting rights.56 
It became easy for many Americans to think of the resistance to Black 
voting as a thing of the past.57  Nor was this a merely untutored assumption; 
a new generation of preeminent voting rights scholars insisted that the 
traditional voting rights jurisprudence had outlived its time.58  The practice 
of measuring modern voting restrictions by weighing the individual’s right 
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After four years of litigation and great expense, and even after two federal courts 
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from 156 to 383. 
Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 44, at 493. 
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broadly to all citizens, including the illiterate and poor.  See KEYSSAR, supra note 32, at 275, 
283. 
 56. See Gerald R. Ford, Remarks upon Signing a Bill Extending the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 (Aug. 6, 1975). 
 57. In City of Rome v. United States, for example, the Supreme Court recognized that 
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 58. See generally Guy-Uriel Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1099 
(2005). 
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to vote against the state’s interest in preventing fraud was deemed 
antiquated.59  Such cases, scholars argued, should turn on the structural 
benefits and harms to the whole of our democracy on both sides of the 
equation; the old focus on individual rights could be safely retired in favor of 
a “structural” turn in voting rights.60  And, while the leading structuralists 
have not ignored race, it is fair to note that structuralists systematically 
questioned the centrality of race rather than partisan discrimination in 
contemporary voting rights cases.61 
Even as the academy turned its attention, the VRA, the symbol of the 
federal affirmation of the Black vote, was being gutted by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.62  After several warning shots across the bow, the Supreme Court, in 
Shelby County v. Holder,63 invalidated the coverage formula readopted by 
Congress, rendering its provisions intact but moot.64  The Court did so on the 
premise that the country had changed and largely overcame its historic 
suppression of the Black vote.65  Essentially, the Court determined that the 
“era of big racism” was over.66 
Yet, the contestation of Black voting never disappeared.  Even as the new 
voting rights cases turned ostensibly more political rather than racial, the 
undermining of Black and other minority voting power remained clear:  
gerrymandering, voter-ID laws, and other voter dilution tactics sought to 
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 62. See generally Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).  Indeed, by the time 
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 65. See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 44, at 497–500. 
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reify political power but consistently did so while tracing well-known racial 
lines.67 
Further, the long-standing issue of felon disenfranchisement, combined 
with the racially disproportionate makeup of mass incarcerated individuals, 
equated to racial disempowerment, barring wide swathes of Black voters 
from the polls.68  Felon disenfranchisement cements the view that it is natural 
for Black voters to be excluded systematically from elections.  Where states 
have reversed felon disenfranchisement, political backlash and retrenchment 
seeks to stymie the enfranchisement of this disproportionately minority 
vote.69 
Although the focus of this Article thus far has been on efforts imposed on 
the Black community to stymie voting, it is worth noting that such sustained 
efforts also have destabilizing effects from within the Black community.  
Felon disenfranchisement is one such example.  In some states, large 
segments of the Black community are disabled from voting due to their 
felony records.70  It is not surprising, therefore, that, stripped of the power to 
vote, many grow defensive, dismissive, or cynical about the importance of 
voting.71  Whether out of self-protection or embarrassment of a bruising 
experience, a “forfeited” right may quickly become a disdained right.  This 
cynicism is not merely an individualistic concern; rather, just as shared norms 
among the educated reinforce voting as an important civic duty, shared 
disdain among the disenfranchised also may sap the proclivity—of even the 
eligible—to vote.72  This disdain for voting may quickly spread more 
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for Reform, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 66 (2003). 
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generally from those who can no longer vote, to activists and others who, 
understandably, (de)cry, “what has voting done for us, lately?”  So, the 
effects of Black voter suppression can radiate out from the inside, hollowing 
out the desire to vote and corroding Black political participation, even in the 
absence of obvious obstacles. 
Of course, it would be naïve to think that the rejection of Black political 
power solely centers on voting.  The relationship between voting and 
legitimacy can be subtler.  For example, many Americans rejected Barack 
Obama as a legitimate president based on the baseless, racist myth that he 
was a foreign-born Muslim.73  While some may have glommed on to this 
belief, in part, because they (consciously or unconsciously) perceived 
Obama’s presidency to be powered by a Black electorate, others simply 
found a Black president unbearable.74  Thus, the rejection of voting may 
simply be one facet of a wider rejection of Black political power; singling 
out Black voting may be too narrow or simplistic.75 
But, none of this dismisses the systematic external efforts to undermine 
the Black vote as such.  Even before Shelby County, there was constant 
sniping in the ground war to contain minority voting.  Broadly “conservative” 
forces have consistently argued for stringent ballot measures, the curtailing 
of extended voting hours, changes in voting practices and technology, and at 
times, they have attacked legal voting practices, such as “Souls to the Polls,” 
to, predictably, depress minority voting.76  Only those with an appropriately 
dark sense of humor can appreciate the result of the Supreme Court’s 
conclusion that the country had so changed that the VRA was not needed.77  
Within hours of the VRA being denuded, the Texas legislature proposed new, 
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more restrictive voting laws certain to depress Black voting.78  Texas was, 
predictably, followed by a rash of other states.79 
Thus, the present is marked by increasingly virulent contestation of 
minority votes, couched in terms of securing voting integrity, despite the 
persistent failure of even the most politically motivated to find any evidence 
of voter fraud.80  Each instance of resistance takes its place in the long, 
historical opposition to Black citizenship.  Even as I write this manuscript, 
the Supreme Court has further weakened the VRA, determining that vote 
tabulation methods that disproportionately burden minority voters do not 
violate section 2 of the VRA.81  Although the ramifications are yet to be seen, 
there is the distinct sense that the VRA’s wall of defense has collapsed, and 
the battles that African American marchers thought were won generations 
ago will have to be refought.82  The war to exclude the Black vote may now 
continue with minimal federal oversight. 
The point is clear.  Resistance to minority voting, especially against that 
of Black Americans, is a defining fault line in American voting rights.  Such 
resistance undermines Black Americans’ demands to be considered full and 
equal citizens.  Indeed, it is telling that voting legislation that would ease 
burdens on Black Americans is painted as a ploy to permit mass noncitizen 
voting.  Senator Ted Cruz, for example, falsely and cynically asserted that 
the proposed “For The People Act”—intended to repair the judicial damage 
done to the VRA—would permit millions of “illegal aliens” to vote.83  This 
rhetoric intertwines calls for Black voting rights with the rights of others who 
are viewed as outside the core body politic.  It elides the call to protect Black 
votes with those who are, in fact, not full citizens and, in so doing, taps into 
the historical sense that Black demands come from those who are not fully 
American.  Without needing to be precise, it undermines the claim that 
franchise belongs equally to Black Americans and is not to be contested. 
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II.  COMPULSORY VOTING AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 
The unfettered right of Black Americans to vote and to be secure in their 
political equality has been under attack since its inception.  Efforts to secure 
the Black vote by expanding access to voting have obviously changed much, 
but at every turn, these initiatives have faced renewed resistance.84  In other 
words, universal access to voting has been insufficient to secure the Black 
vote.  What is needed now is a change from political norms of allowance to 
expectation, from permission to obligation.  The most decisive way to 
foreclose the inchoate sense that there is something innately suspicious about 
Black voting is to establish a regime that legally obligates all Americans to 
vote. 
Advocates for compulsory voting are hardly new; they are nearly as 
ancient as democracy itself.85  Yet, compulsory voting advocates in the 
United States are dismissed out of hand.  Such calls are seen as not viable, 
constitutionally dubious, and perhaps, even anti-American; this is true 
despite our shockingly low rates of voting participation and gaping political 
inequality.86  Thus, an exploration of compulsory voting could address a host 
of democratic ills apart from the racial focus here.  Compulsory voting is an 
already compelling idea, but importantly, the fact that it can temper our 
historical racial battle about the meaning of Black citizenship makes it even 
more urgent. 
For clarity’s sake, let me define “compulsory voting.”  A system of 
compulsory voting is any system in which citizens have a widely known legal 
duty to participate in a range of local and national elections.87  The required 
participation is obviously aimed at prompting eligible voters to register 
political preferences of some sort, but it may—indeed, in America it probably 
must—allow them to register a protest vote, most likely by choosing “none 
of the above” or submitting a blank ballot.88  Indeed, in some jurisdictions, 
citizens merely need to register that they appeared at their polling place and 
need not cast a ballot at all.89  Complementary to citizens’ obligations to vote 
would be states’ requirements to ensure and track compliance with the voting 
requirement, similar to statutory obligations to track compulsory school 
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attendance.90  We can also compare an obligation to vote to our jury duty 
ideals, drawing lessons from these systems’ successes and failures. 
In what follows, I will focus not on the constitutional nor political 
machinations required to institute compulsory voting.91  I will only briefly 
note that compulsory voting might be instituted for federal elections, in all 
probability, generating similar voting patterns for a wide range of major state 
and local elections held simultaneously.92  In any case, it is clear that 
compulsory voting could be adopted by states individually, securing the 
important benefits for themselves and influencing national norms.93  There 
are also intriguing proposals to mobilize substate local election laws to 
reinforce voting.94  But, rather than a manual on how to install compulsory 
voting, my goal is to address the philosophical arguments for and against it.  
First, I will survey the considerable democratic arguments for compulsory 
voting.  Then, I will address the most prominent arguments against 
compulsory voting.  Lastly, I will illustrate the important racial benefits it 
offers. 
As mentioned, compulsory voting is an ancient idea.95  In ancient Athens, 
voters were shepherded with “red-dyed rope” to voting stations.96  When that 
proved ineffective, voters were simply paid to compel voting.97  Likewise, 
compulsory voting is an ordinary feature of elections in a number of countries 
around the world.98  Not surprisingly, countries that have adopted 
compulsory voting have vastly higher rates of voting participation, both 
higher than the United States (an admittedly low bar) and higher than their 
comparable neighbors.99  Encouragingly, even nations that have ended 
experiments with compulsory voting experience elevated voting levels, at 
least for some period of time.100 
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Significantly increasing voter participation is surely sufficient reason to 
visit the idea of compulsory voting.101  The notoriously low American voter 
participation rate means that, even in heavily contested national elections, 
less than a majority of eligible voters are tallied.102  These numbers are vastly 
lower in less glamorous, local elections.103  Ironically, these local elections, 
though less symbolic than the presidential election, exert the greatest 
influence on the day-to-day life of voters and their communities.104  Thus, 
national policies are often decided by a minority of a minority, while 
important local policies on policing, housing, and countless other issues are 
decided by the small set of individuals who bother to vote.105  Under such 
conditions, the typically unquestioned democratic warrant of our electoral 
politics begins to look shaky, indeed.106  Without guarantees that the minority 
is perfectly representative of the interests of all, the unavoidable dangers of 
minority rule loom.107 
Compulsory voting offers an obvious solution to the democratic legitimacy 
gap of low voter turnout.  One need not imagine perfect compliance to 
recognize the vast difference between overwhelming portions of the 
population voting and a small minority determining government policy.  
Even setting aside the historic combat over Black political power, low voter 
turnout (i.e., de facto minority rule) exacerbates political inequality. 
In America, the educated and wealthy disproportionately vote, biasing 
politics in their favor.108  Nor is this an easily curable effect of low salience 
elections because voter inequality is often highest in high turnout (but 
noncompulsory) elections.109  This, in combination with the pernicious 
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influence of money in electoral politics, creates the cynical impression 
among much of the public that politics is a game in which the rich and 
well-connected divvy up political goods.110  With both the content of policy 
and the identity of political leaders dominated by the wealthy and educated, 
certain political options are simply considered off the table, and the wider 
public, especially the vulnerable, understand politics as an insider’s game.111  
This leads to a vicious cycle in which inequality breeds cynicism, which 
breeds further inequality. 
A cold-eyed or cynical reader may wonder if this inequality is a problem 
to be solved or a feature to be protected.  While de jure prohibitions from 
voting may offend our sensibilities, is forcing insufficiently invested citizens 
to vote a worthwhile goal?  Apathetic or ignorant voters might have random 
preferences, adding nothing but noise to the political system.112  Worse, they 
might be easily manipulated by demagogues (where a demagogue is always 
read as one appealing to whatever views one abhors). 
Such views assume a correct set of political conclusions rarely agreed 
upon.  There are surely abhorrent ways of political reasoning, but there is 
little reason to think they are confined to the uneducated or turn on 
suppression of democratic participation.  History has given little reason to 
believe that electoral aristocracies, whether liberal or conservative, reliably 
result in morally attractive outcomes.113  Even outside atrocities and 
genocidal regimes, the politically structured inequalities of our current 
moment hardly recommend themselves. 
But, further, the view that voters are too apathetic and ignorant takes a 
static view of voter education levels.114  Academics sometimes seem to 
delight in evidence detailing voter ignorance.115  Yet, there is also 
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encouraging evidence in the opposite direction.  For example, voters often 
learn about relevant issues immediately before elections, even if that 
knowledge recedes when not needed.116  Many voters take cues from trusted 
family, friends, and community leaders, which, if not ideal, is hardly an 
illegitimate method of voting.117  Viewed without snobbery, I often suspect 
the gap between self-declared “educated voters” and disdained “uniformed 
voters” breaks down rather quickly.  In any case, there is reason to believe 
that, in a world where everyone knows that they are obligated to vote, voters 
would increase efforts to collect sufficient information, or campaign tactics 
would change to consider the new electoral reality.118 
What if voter apathy turns out to be a more hardened or principled 
resistance?  Do voters have a right not to vote, be it a First Amendment right 
to avoid compelled speech or a deeper, autonomy-based right to ignore the 
whirling of politics around them?  There is certainly a widely held sense that 
requiring voting would run against a reflexive American individualism and 
the rejection of positive political duties.119  Relatedly, even if there were no 
autonomy-based right against voting, enforcement methods could be 
unjustifiable.120 
I find it difficult to credit bald autonomy claims to exit elections.  There 
are countless positive political duties that already inconvenience citizens, 
from registering with selective services to filing taxes and complying with 
countless civic regulations.  Although each of these positive political duties 
are met periodically with protestations that they violate one’s autonomy, all 
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but the libertarians among us recognize these duties are justified by the public 
goods they secure.  This is particularly compelling for civic duties that 
scaffold our very political rights. 
The First Amendment arguments are equally unavailing.  Compulsory 
voting would not require citizens to vote for any particular candidate.  Ballots 
could allow write-in candidates or explicit voting for “none of the above.”121  
In some compulsory voting regimes, citizens are required to appear at voting 
stations on election day, but they are not actually required to cast a vote, if 
they refuse.122  Indeed, compulsory voting does more to secure a First 
Amendment right of conspicuous rejection of political options than 
widespread nonvoting, which makes suppression, apathy, and rejection 
indistinguishable. 
Enforcement concerns are perhaps even less pressing.  One robust lesson 
from the compulsory voting regimes of the world is that even a range of 
minor inducements and minor formal legal penalties, almost universally 
unenforced, achieve overwhelming compliance.  Italy, for example, 
“punishes” nonvoters by posting their names on a community notice board 
and generates the highest voter turnout of Western democracies.123  Australia 
threatens nonvoters with a fifty-dollar fine.124  Even countries that threaten 
more severe punishments—Greek nonvoters risk imprisonment of one to 
twelve months—threaten these punishments in name only; indeed, 
enforcement is so lax—in Australia fines affect only 4 percent of voters, and, 
in Greece, jail time is not actually used at all—that enforcement provisions 
border on symbolic.125  Yet, even with lax enforcement, countries such as 
Belgium, Australia, Greece, and Italy have among the highest turnouts in the 
industrialized world, ranging from 78 percent to 94 percent, compared to 54 
percent in the United States.126  Further, countless other incentivizing 
mechanisms could be used to enforce voting, such as eligibility to 
government benefits.127 
Lastly, one might think that, even without harsh sanctions, imposing a 
legal obligation to vote punishes the most economically and racially 
vulnerable.  High powered professionals tend to have sufficient control over 
their schedules and, perhaps, live in areas where voting is relatively quick 
and painless.128  Yet, as painful election day pictures and the current fights 
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to reduce urban polling stations remind us, many in less well served areas 
spend hours waiting in line to cast their ballots.129  For a secretary or 
machinist who may have much less flexibility to restructure any given 
workday, the added duty may hardly seem a favor at all. 
This utterly sensible concern seems to me, again, to take too static a view 
of how our voting practices might look under a compulsory voting regime.  
Central to obligating ordinary citizens to vote is requiring the state to build 
sufficient infrastructure both to meet and to monitor this requirement.  A 
world in which we invert voting from right to civic duty is one in which the 
state must reinforce its voting mechanisms, whether by creating voting 
holidays, opening more polling places, expanding voting periods, or 
initiating creative ideas, such as using the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to 
register voters.130 
It is fair to question why we should imagine that a legal duty to vote would 
result in the state’s making compliance easy.  As a friend reminded me, 
paying taxes is a legal duty and does not feel particularly easy.131  While 
specifically racial facets of this question are addressed later, I think there is 
reason to be generally optimistic.  If legal obligations are hardly effortless to 
meet, a wider view shows that reciprocal obligations on citizen and state can 
be transformative.  For example, American schools have both a complicated 
anti-Catholic history, as well as a host of serious problems, but we ought not 
ignore how transformative the shift to compulsory education was a century 
ago.132  Further, registering for selective service or complying with numerous 
vehicle registration requirements can be unpleasant, but people broadly 
proceed smoothly with such registration.133  Even setting aside the annual 
grumbling, perhaps it is no coincidence that we have enabled and secured 
electronic tax filing and payment before electronic voting.134  Paired with 
state monitoring, financial incentives, and public shaming, we have every 
reason to believe that compulsory voting would lead, if not to utopian visions, 
to vast improvements in individuals’ ability to vote. 
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Another rich example of a compulsory duty of citizenship is jury service.  
Jury service obviously differs in interesting ways from voting.  For example, 
juries reason over a particular set of facts (and some limited questions of law) 
rather than considering the entire breadth of politics that elections present.135  
Further, jury service is often much more demanding, requiring days, weeks, 
or even months from individual citizens.136  But, jury service is a way to 
empower citizens to reason together, as civic equals, and to direct the state 
power.137  There is a similarly long and turbulent history of protecting jury 
duty against racial and gender exclusion, not only for instrumental reasons 
but also to secure an important symbol of equal citizenship.138  The powerful 
commitment of jury duty is not only that we, as a society, permit citizens to 
do this but also that we insist that citizens ought to do this.  To be sure, jury 
service is a double-edged example.  On one hand, jury service is a model 
example of compulsory service that is imposed without oppressive 
criminalization or enforcement.139  On the other hand, however, jury service 
cautions against hoping that compulsory service automatically leads to robust 
financial and institutional support.140 
These democratic health concerns provide reason to support a compulsory 
voting regime.  Earlier, we discussed the structuralist turn in voting rights, 
which held that partisan threats had eclipsed the historical threats of racism 
to our democracy.141  Despite my efforts to show how central racism remains 
to the undermining of elections, it is surely too much to pretend that race is 
the only factor driving the democratic ills canvassed.  Further, others may 
find my explanations unconvincing.  Yet, even if we disagree on the precise 
extent, all but the intractable will see that Black voter suppression remains 
an American problem and a hovering threat.  Further, we can reach consensus 
that our bruising history gives Black Americans reason to be wary of such 
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voter suppression.  And, failing even that, it is easy to note that compulsory 
voting secures a unique form of political equality across class, education, and 
myriad other markers.  Noticing these other democratic reasons to support 
compulsory voting is not merely a rearguard strategy.  One could be 
ecumenical about the precise equality securing features of compulsory voting 
and still support it. 
The ultimate argument that compulsory voting would simply violate 
American norms boils down to little more than, “we don’t want to because 
we don’t want to.”  Worse yet, some of the American allergy to universal 
voting surely stems from our historic distaste for Black voting.  But, the point 
here is to give reasons for why we should change just such a norm.  An 
individual autonomy right to be left alone or fear of coercive enforcement 
measures does not stand up as a reason to avoid compulsory voting. 
III.  REINFORCING THE LEGITIMACY OF BLACK VOTING 
The most common objections to compulsory voting are unconvincing.  
But, more importantly, the promise of compulsory voting to close—or at 
least temper—a long-lasting racial wound has hardly been noticed.  
Understandably, some may be skeptical of such an ambitious claim.  Part of 
the examined history reveals how Black voting has met racist challenges, 
despite formal legal protections.  Why, then, should we believe that 
compulsory voting would protect the Black franchise where other measures 
have failed? 
Given our history, it would be foolhardy to offer guarantees.  Still, the 
through lines in the distrust of Black voting are particularly vulnerable to a 
regime of compulsory voting.  While rejection of Black citizenship is 
premised on the racist view that Black Americans cannot legitimately 
exercise political power, this view can no longer be consciously (or, perhaps, 
even unconsciously) presented as a straightforward rejection of Black 
Americans’ legal right to vote.  Thus, it is expressed in vague assertions of 
voter fraud.  To be sure, those who traffic in these claims rarely make them 
with precision.142  But, contemporary versions are a stew of imagined votes 
by noncitizens and ballot-harvesting, where politically naïve or disinterested 
potential voters are manipulated, along with fabricated votes from minority 
communities.  In short, the claims turn on the unfounded, but unshakeable, 
suspicion that there are “too many votes” coming out of minority 
communities.143 
Compulsory voting would end one of the more intractable claims 
challenging Black votes:  the untethered claim that displays of Black voting 
power are, by themselves, suspicious.  Such claims are particularly 
frustrating because they are often dressed up as entirely objective rejections 
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based on predicted voter turnout.  But, such expectations are typically based 
on thin evidence, often with racist assumptions built in.  Indeed, the “too 
many votes” contestation need not be based on evidence at all; rather, as 
noted in the attack on election offices144 and suspicion by ordinary, hostile 
white Americans, a merely uneasy sense that Black Americans are voting en 
masse is enough to engender suspicion.  Obviously, a regime of compulsory 
voting denudes this sentiment.  In a world in which 75 to 95 percent of the 
population complies with a voting requirement, there is little room for 
malicious conspiracy theories when minority votes are tallied. 
A regime of universal compulsory voting inverts our expectations, thus 
sapping such claims of their power.  By its very nature, a legal duty to vote 
dismisses the argument that some are intellectually incapable or too naïve to 
vote.  Requiring citizens to vote places on them the duty to educate 
themselves in light of a civic duty.  But, in any case, it makes concrete the 
constitutional commitment that no authority can be trusted to determine if a 
citizen’s vote is informed enough.  Compulsory voting ends challenges 
rooted in a citizen’s adequacy to vote, whether in historical applications of 
intelligence or literacy tests or more modern disparagement that Black voters 
are simply too stupid to know their true interests. 
So far, we have focused on the more global ways in which compulsory 
voting addresses suspicions surrounding Black Americans’ voting.  The 
focus on this wider view is important because inverting the assumption that 
widespread Black voting is suspicious is as important as any particular 
doctrinal shift.  Still, it is encouraging to note that, as we zoom in on discrete 
contemporary racial voting battlegrounds, compulsory voting also offers 
fresh solutions to many granular controversies. 
Take, for example, the explosive debate around Georgia’s recently passed 
election law.  Supporters claim the law was mischaracterized, merely 
standardizing Georgia’s election practices and instituting voter integrity 
measures.145  Critics charged something much darker, portraying the law as 
a rebirth of the Jim Crow South.146  In particular, provisions ending “Souls 
to the Polls”147 programs by closing Sunday voting and prohibiting giving 
anything of value, including water, to people waiting to vote, continued the 
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long history of contesting Black voting.148  Further, ominous proposed bills 
give Republicans with (unfounded) suspicious of voting fraud power to 
control voting in Fulton County, which is a disproportionately Black county, 
while leaving the rest of Georgia untouched.149 
In a world in which voting is a requirement, such machinations become 
largely nonsensical or counterproductive.  Where the state is obligated not 
only to allow but also to ensure that every eligible person votes, there is little 
reason to stymie any particular moment of voting.  Indeed, under such a 
regime, a state would plausibly enlist such civic organizations to meet the 
legal requirement.  As we noted in discussing the needed structural election 
reinforcement, a state that imposed an obligation to vote and had a reciprocal 
obligation to track compliance would be incentivized to expand, rather than 
restrict, voting opportunities.150 
It would be foolhardy to think this would mean there could never be 
contestation of Black votes.  Defining and counting the number of eligible 
voters, for example, might become hotly contested, much as population and 
racial data are in the census.151  But, once the general shape of the population 
was known, it would be a marker of state failure if it were shown that an 
embarrassingly low percentage of Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, or 
Asian Americans, etc., had complied.  By analogy, though public school 
systems are plagued with racial discrepancies, where these discrepancies 
come to public light, they engender heated public and political debate.152  
Likewise, compulsory jury service stands as a model that has inverted 
long-standing racial scars.  Whatever the important failings on the ground, 
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the fact that jury service is compulsory means that legal and political 
conversation centers on the gap between Black representation on juries rather 
than the once held reflexive supposition that Black representation is 
suspicious.153 
The same applies to the slew of proposals and recently passed laws 
imposing voter-ID requirements in several states.  Critics rightfully point out 
that such laws “protect” against a nonexistent problem; there is voluminous 
evidence that in-person voter fraud is nearly nonexistent.154  Such laws do, 
however, disproportionately disenfranchise minority voters.155  Proponents 
often express elaborate bafflement that a simple identification requirement 
could be problematic, insisting these laws are nothing more than 
commonsense security measures.156  A further, more subtle argument could 
recognize that, while actual instances of voter fraud are exceedingly rare, 
voter-ID laws receive widespread popular support and thus play an important 
role in the perceived legitimacy of elections.157 
Once again, a compulsory voting regime reorients the debate, curing the 
poisonous racial politics.  One reason voter-ID laws have become so highly 
 
 153. For a critique that discrimination in prosecutions, grand juries, and juries is reflective 
of the inherent racism of the criminal law system, see generally Paul Butler, The System Is 
Working the Way It Is Supposed To:  The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 75 
(2016). 
 154. See Debunking the Voter Fraud Myth, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/debunking-voter-fraud-myth 
[https://perma.cc/XJ3J-6W93]; Jessica Huseman, How the Case for Voter Fraud Was 
Tested—And Utterly Failed, PROPUBLICA (June 19, 2018, 3:40 PM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/kris-kobach-voter-fraud-kansas-trial 
[https://perma.cc/5DLF-XVB3]; Rebecca Shabad, Barr Claims Voting by Mail Will Lead to 
Fraud, “Counterfeiting.”  Admits He Has Zero Evidence., NBC NEWS (June 26, 2020,  
7:39 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/barr-claims-voting-mail-will-
lead-fraud-counterfeiting-admits-he-n1232208 [https://perma.cc/R38B-X84U]. 
 155. See WENDY R. WEISER & MAX FELDMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., THE STATE OF 
VOTING 2018 (2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/state-voting-
2018 [https://perma.cc/XL4F-DHFH]; Vann R. Newkirk II, How Shelby County v. Holder 
Broke America, ATLANTIC (July 10, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2018/07/how-shelby-county-broke-america/564707/ [https://perma.cc/8QFJ-W2DQ]. 
 156. See LORI MINNITE & DAVID CALLAHAN, DEMOS, SECURING THE VOTE:  AN ANALYSIS 
OF ELECTION FRAUD 14 (2003), https://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/EDR_-
_Securing_the_Vote.pdf [https://perma.cc/27HA-T8UR]; Derek T. Muller, What’s Old Is 
New Again:  The Nineteenth Century Voter Registration Debates and Lessons About Voter 
Identification Disputes, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 109, 109 (2017); Ross Douthat, Opinion,  
The Myths of Voter ID, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/12/ 
opinion/voter-id-study-republicans-democrats.html [https://perma.cc/8TYN-AGSZ].  
Whatever their legitimacy, voter-ID laws, when surveyed, enjoy broad support. See HANS VON 
SPAKOVSKY, HERITAGE FOUND., VOTER PHOTO IDENTIFICATION:  PROTECTING THE SECURITY 
OF ELECTIONS 5 (2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/07/voter-photo-
identification-protecting-the-security-of-elections [https://perma.cc/CE9V-THZC]; Results of 
SurveyUSA News Poll #17639, SURV. USA (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.surveyusa.com/client/ 
PollReport.aspx?g=a26cf8f3-4a0a-40e5-a503-66444130ca17 [https://perma.cc/TF87-
VEQH].  Further, sheer empirical clarity is unlikely to settle debates about the relative risks 
and costs of even small amounts of voter fraud. See LORRAINE C. MINNITE, THE POLITICS OF 
VOTER FRAUD 8–9 (2007); Chad Flanders, Note, How to Think About Voter Fraud (and Why), 
41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 93, 94–95 (2007). 
 157. See generally Flanders, supra note 156. 
664 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
contested is both because of their racially disproportionate impact and 
because voter-ID advocates often resist widespread ID access, undermining 
claims that such proposals are good faith attempts absent racial animus.158  
Where everyone is required to vote, the question of whether identification is 
required becomes a technical process question.  Under a compulsory voting 
regime, if the state required an ID to vote, it would also be an obligation to 
make required identification easily accessible.  Indeed, by the same token, 
voter-ID advocates argue that, if the perception of election security is 
symbolically important, so, too, is the perceived legitimacy of large swathes 
of the electorate having access to voting, particularly Black voters, who have 
weighty historical reasons to be suspicious of attempts to disenfranchise 
them.159  Those who held a genuine interest in election security ought to be 
amenable to state-provided verification, and those motivated by racial and 
partisan animus would understand that there was nothing to gain. 
A similar pattern holds for a number of tangential voting ills squarely 
addressed by a legal requirement for compulsory voting.  The current fights 
in state after state over voting reforms, from early voting to rank choice 
voting to insufficient voting stations and frustratingly long lines, would not 
be solved by simple fiat.160  But, reversing norms such that universal voting 
is a duty and expectation makes it natural for states to massively expand 
voting opportunities.161  State and federal oversight, stiffened by financial 
incentives, could spur compliance.162  Even the most recent voting 
controversies, such as whether votes cast in the wrong precinct ought to be 
discarded,163 may seem more naturally resolved when the norm is one of 
universal voting. 
To be sure, not every form of voter contestation can be settled by simply 
overlaying compulsory voting on the current electorate.  The racially 
disproportionate effects of felon disenfranchisement have historically 
contributed to the same lines of electoral contestation of Black votes.164  
Compulsory voting does not, without more, settle this question.  In a regime 
of compulsory voting, therefore, we must still decide whether voting is 
required of currently eligible voters or whether the franchise should be 
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expanded to include offenders currently serving prison time.  There are 
important arguments for allowing those in prison to vote because it protects 
an important civic or human right, it keeps these individuals more tightly 
civically bound, it reduces recidivism, and it would be more racially just.165  
Others plausibly argue that loss of the franchise is a natural feature of 
rehabilitation, a period in which one is temporarily removed from the body 
politic.166  Whatever the answer to that question, a compulsory voting regime 
establishes a clear ethos as to what should happen after one has served their 
sentence.167  For those attracted by curing our current democratic legitimacy 
gap and healing the racial wound around voting, the answer is clearly to 
restore former offenders to full voting status, alongside other citizens who 
are required to vote.  An obligation to vote reinforces our interlocking bonds 
as citizens, particularly when they are frayed by our violent racial history, 
and it repudiates the view that former offenders must remain forever cast 
away from the rest of society.168 
Further, an obligation to vote holds promise for another potentially acidic 
effect of felon disenfranchisement.  As mentioned, the racially 
disproportionate distribution of felon disenfranchisement not only makes it 
seem all too natural to suspicious white voters that Black and Hispanic voters 
are excluded but also may cause Black voters to internalize the same view.169  
A community in which the ability to vote is disrupted for many is less likely 
to inculcate voting norms in the next generation.170  There is important 
evidence that those who are steered toward voting at a young age remain 
committed voters.171  Meanwhile, many of those who are foreclosed from 
voting will become cynical or disdainful of its importance.172  Such cynicism 
is too easily spread.  Thus, requiring the right to vote equally for ex-offenders 
can easily arrest the corrosive ways in which Black voters with the ability to 
vote have turned their backs on voting. 
Of course, universal voting may not solve—and indeed, may heighten— 
battles over partisan gerrymandering.173  Facing the prospect of universal 
minority voting, partisans will draw districts to maximize political 
advantage.  The effects of such gerrymandering are highly situation-specific.  
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In some places, packing in minorities will be seen as an attempt to limit 
voting power to token representatives.  In other places, packed minority 
districts will be viewed as an attempt to guarantee minority voters 
jurisdictions where they exert decisive political power.  As with the census, 
heated fights may intensify when the political stakes are raised.174  There is 
little chance of predicting any clear dispositions, as results will be sensitive 
to the strength of demographic voting preferences, housing segregation, and 
countless other variables. 
These concerns, while of terrific importance, have largely focused, albeit 
at a high level of generality, on how compulsory voting would affect the 
mechanisms of our political culture.  But, the reason voting is the grounds of 
such pitched battle, does not, it seems to me, reduce its admittedly important 
role in determining political power.  Nor is voting merely about collecting 
information on citizen preferences.  Were that all that were involved, we 
could replace voting with ever more sophisticated sampling methods or allow 
statistically representative sample sizes of the electorate to vote.  Voting 
stands for something more immediately obvious and, yet, romantic and hard 
to qualify; it stands for belonging, civic equality, the right to have one’s say 
and duty to reason together.175  Imagining the wide-ranging effects that 
compulsory voting would have on our voting structures is difficult, but its 
effects on the underlying political claims and on the democratic dignity of 
Black Americans would be even more profound.  Ultimately, compulsory 
voting is a contribution to securing a shared view of equal Black citizenship. 
IV.  FRANCHISE AND CITIZENSHIP 
The link between voting and citizenship is ancient.  Aristotle makes clear 
that an important measure of full citizenship is the right to an equal voice in 
civic matters.176  Others might contribute to the good of a polity:  metics 
(resident aliens) and tradesmen contributed to a society’s functioning and 
wealth, women participated in the good of a household, and even slaves, like 
useful tools, promoted the collective well-being.177  But, the mark of full 
citizenship was the right to share in public governance by voting and holding 
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office; to rule, and be ruled, in turn.178  Hence, to be a citizen was to be 
endowed with “franchise,” the full rights and responsibilities of a Greek 
citizen.179  It is from this term that we associate “disenfranchisement” as the 
loss of voting privileges.180 
Through the tumultuous dictatorships and empires of ancient Athens and 
Rome, there remained an understanding that the fullest citizens should share 
in steering the direction of the state.181  For otherwise eligible individuals to 
be stripped of their vote was considered a mark of infamia or a form of “‘civil 
death.’”182  These ideas found their way through classic Western 
philosophical texts, making explicit the connection between voting and 
political equality. 
The intellectual heritage of Greek and Roman debates around citizenship 
were entirely alive to the educated men forming America.183  This political 
tradition directly influenced nascent political institutions and leaders, like 
George Washington, who viewed themselves as embodying classical 
archetypes.184  Classic concepts of equality as requiring representation were, 
ironically, part of the revolutionary call, and public debates constantly 
referenced political freedoms idealized in ancient Athens, Sparta, Carthage, 
or some smaller city in Asia Minor.185  James Madison, for example, made 
explicit the connection between citizenship and the right of wealthy and poor, 
honored and humble alike, to participate in elections.186  In short, from the 
beginning, a notion of shared rule, reflected in a “republican form of 
government” was intertwined in the American concept of full citizenship.187 
Such idealization shows that the right to vote has been a fixed star in 
ancient conceptions of full political membership.  But, it is painfully obvious 
that wide swathes glimpsed this star from underneath deep shadows:  the 
omission of the majority of the polity from the exercising of political voice 
is as ancient as the noble exaltations of citizenship. 
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Even our starting point betrays this tension.  Aristotle is foundational in 
the Western tradition of grounding citizenship in shared civic voice.188  
Lacking franchise was to understand that you were not in the project of joint 
governance, you were being ruled over; a subject, rather than a coauthor, of 
your political community.189  Indeed, on the most ambitious readings of 
Aristotle, such political agency was critical in realizing one’s full human 
agency.190  Although Aristotle would not have used the modern locution, one 
would naturally think that being denied such coauthorship would undermine 
one’s fealty to the polity.191 
Yet, in nearly the same passages in which he recognizes the importance of 
an equal civic voice, Aristotle casually dismisses the vast majority of the 
population as neither capable nor appropriate for citizenship.192  The reasons 
are varied and unattractive.  Debates over who truly counted as an Athenian 
were of similar ferocity as our contemporary debates over undocumented 
immigrants; meanwhile, ordinary laborers were presumed to be too burdened 
with their daily tasks for political responsibilities.193  The bulk of metics were 
considered to have insufficient capacities of reason to gain citizenship, 
women were hardly considered at all, and, infamously, some were born 
natural slaves and, thus, were never meant to share in civic deliberations.194  
While all contributed to the polity and shared in its success, no more than a 
handful were citizens. 
These deficiencies are hardly limited to ancient blind spots.  From ancient 
times, Jews in Europe were systematically excluded from full citizenship.195  
John Locke penned his paeans to equality and liberty when indentured 
servitude was common, universal suffrage distant and while he was 
becoming an influential and wealthy British administrator for the American 
slave trade.196  Thomas Jefferson penned the Declaration of Independence 
while owning hundreds of slaves.197  George Washington’s relentless pursuit 
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of Ona Judge, a slave that escaped from his home, is now well known.198  
Indeed, even as they wrote soaring speeches comparing taxation without 
representation to slavery, the majority of the “Founding Fathers” owned 
slaves.199 
The historical exclusion of women from voting is also illustrative of the 
complex relationship between citizenship and franchise.200  While foreigners 
and slaves were, by definition, excluded from citizenship, women were 
excluded for reasons ranging from the danger of political domestic strife at 
home to their supposed irrationality.201  Further, a woman’s political interests 
were thought to be sufficiently represented by the male head of household.202  
Yet, importantly, women, unlike foreigners and slaves, unquestionably 
belonged within the polity. 
This tension was highlighted in the late 1800s when Virginia Minor, a 
Missouri suffragette, sued203 for the right to vote under the recently passed 
Fourteenth Amendment.204  There was no doubt that Minor was a citizen, 
and thus, could not have her “privileges and immunities” abridged; instead 
of enfranchising women, the Court infamously held that voting simply was 
not a necessary privilege of citizenship.205  Rather than the lofty ideal of an 
equally shared voice, citizenship merely implied “reciprocal obligations” of 
“[a]llegiance and protection” between the individual and the state.206  Thus, 
“the words ‘subject,’ ‘inhabitant,’ and ‘citizen’” were all interchangeable 
names for “membership” in a nation.207 
So, we see a tension as old as our concepts of citizenship.  On the one hand, 
an ideal of citizenship is defined by sharing a voice through voting.208  On 
the other hand, for most of history, it seemed plain that only a small set of 
persons—in the “West,” propertied white men—would enjoy that first-class 
status.209 
There is no doubt which side of this tension carried the day; the ideal form 
of citizenship proved too attractive to remain reserved for a chosen few.  
From the sweeping histories of the French, English, or American revolutions 
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to the Civil War to women’s suffrage, citizenship and the franchise became 
inextricably intertwined.210  The concept of first-class citizens with special 
rank gave way to a conception that citizenship itself imbued all with special 
dignity.211  The modern age is marked by what Charles Taylor dubbed, the 
“politics of universalism,” defined in principle, if not in practice, by “the 
equal dignity” of all citizens.212  It is reflected in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, harkening back to the Aristotelian richness of citizenship and 
making the right to vote central in that conception.213 
Thus, having your right to vote recognized, and uncontested, is not merely 
an instrumental good for use in effecting political interests; it is also a central 
marker of one’s full membership in a political society and equal dignity with 
fellow citizens.214  It would be an overstatement to believe that the right to 
vote settled every question of equal political membership.215  But, it is, in a 
real sense, both the core and minimum of modern political equality.216  To 
have that vote denied, undermined, or contested without reason is to have 
one’s belonging and equality challenged.217 
Understanding the significance of having one’s vote counted reveals the 
full meaning of armed protestors trying to stop votes from being counted.218  
Whatever the conscious intent of the protestors, rejecting votes from Detroit, 
Philadelphia, and Atlanta, without evidence of fraud, denies the citizenship 
and belonging of those casting the votes.  And, of course, this rejection 
cannot be understood outside of the history of white rejection of Black claims 
of citizenship. 
V.  FRANCHISE, RESISTANCE, AND CITIZENSHIP 
We began with the ancient insight that voting is a marker of full inclusion 
and equality in one’s polity; it is the line between citizen and subject.219  
There is little mysterious about this sense of being a coauthor of your 
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government as opposed to being ruled over.  To be endowed with the 
franchise was, in the ancient parlance, to be able to look fellow citizens in 
the eye and to carry yourself without subservience or being disdained.220  
Understanding this, the ability to vote is much more than an instrumental 
good.  It is a “a certificate of full membership in society . . . [conferring] a 
minimum of social dignity.”221 
Those who have never much considered the right to vote may find such 
claims melodramatic.  For example, were I to move to Provence, exchanging 
my vote for a life of rosé and seafood, it would seem dramatic to toss around 
claims of enslavement.  Even in our own country, voting rates are shockingly 
low among those who have no legal barriers to voting.222  But, such analogies 
are misleading.  It is a very different thing to move to another country or 
decline to vote than to have one’s vote undermined.  The recognition that one 
is not fully a member of the polity is often natural and, at times, even part of 
the point of immigrating to another country.  While the politics of a new 
country may have practical impact, there is often a recognizable gap in an 
immigrant’s ties of citizenship, both felt and recognized in law:  tax burdens, 
property rights, national privileges, and other responsibilities, such as 
registering for the army, may all be different or absent.223 
But, the natural distance between immigrant and citizen may be altered in 
myriad ways.  For some, long-standing influence or domination by another 
country may imbue a sense that one is owed some measure of citizenship as 
common in former colonial relationships.224  Nor is it surprising that after 
sufficient time, many seek citizenship in their new countries or eventually 
chafe at being excluded.  Those born in or taken very young to countries 
where they are not citizens often find their legal status as immigrants 
cognitively and emotionally dissonant.225  It is not surprising they may feel 
it a deep injustice that they are not recognized as full citizens. 
In any case, such examples invite us to question whether being denied the 
franchise is inherently scornful, but they are distant from the American 
resistance to the Black franchise.  Whereas denying the immigrant need not 
convey disparagement,226 the resistance to the Black franchise is historically 
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based in contempt for Black intellectual and moral capabilities.227  Denying 
the legitimacy of Black voting not only connotes that Black people are not 
full members of the community but also communicates that Black people are 
not part of the community because they are beneath white people.228  As 
Martin Luther King, Jr. recognized, “[t]he denial of the vote not only deprives 
the Negro of his constitutional rights—but what is even worse—it degrades 
him as a human being.”229  So, too, when legislatures engage in tactics to 
undermine Black voters or protestors descend on election offices counting 
Black votes, they communicate that Black people—not simply the 
abstraction of Black voters—are degraded. 
Of course, those engaged in these acts will strenuously reject the 
characterization of their efforts as racist degradation.230  However outlandish 
the conspiracy theories about the “stolen” presidential election are, there is 
no doubt of the passionate intensity of those banging on windows or that a 
swath of the country genuinely believes these claims.231  These actors will 
insist they are motivated only by the danger of voter fraud232 rather than by 
racial animus. 
Admittedly, I am largely unmoved by bald protestations of good faith.  
From the very passing of the Reconstruction Amendments, there were those 
who strenuously protested that they held no animus toward the negro, while 
advocating shockingly racist ideas.233  Although comforting to some, it is a 
bizarre idea that actions cannot be racist unless recognized as such by those 
committing them.234  But, more importantly, protests by individuals that they 
do not intend a racist message are quite beside the point.  The long history of 
violent resistance to Black Americans’ voting fixes the social meaning of 
such acts.  By social meaning, I mean that some acts carry messages because 
they fall within certain social understandings.  Going to church or on a date 
or using a racial epithet has a social meaning because it is embedded in a 
history and shared understanding.  Of course, the understanding of any 
particular social understanding can itself be contested and evolve.  The 
meaning of going to church or on a date and the use of “the N word” are each 
under constant contestation.  But, individuals cannot singularly decide that 
their actions stand apart from their sociohistorical contexts. 
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Further, because social meanings exist independently of any individual’s 
control, it is nearly impossible for our behavior to be entirely unaffected by 
social tradition.  Modern dating structures courtship, informing how we 
signal romantic interests.  So, too, social context structures how segments of 
society push back on what they see as unfair or illegitimate.  When white 
vigilantes hear unsubstantiated rumors that there are “too many suspicious” 
Black votes coming out of Philadelphia or Atlanta and they react with armed 
intimidation of election officials, that, too, is imbued with a social 
meaning.235  When legislatures act to dilute the Black vote or undermine 
organized efforts to mobilize Black voters, that, too, has a social meaning.  
These actions depend on conscious or unconscious beliefs that there is 
something illegitimate about “too many Black votes” holding sway in 
political elections.  Intentional or not, this behavior depends on seeing Black 
voters as sufficiently separate from “real” voters or that their votes demand 
special scrutiny.236  It harkens back to an implicit understanding that political 
power is legitimate only when it flows from a legal structure upholding white 
domination.237 
This social understanding reinforces the ugliness of rejecting the Black 
vote.  The political explosions regarding minority voting, whether attempting 
to stop vote counting or politicians who find it natural to curtail minority 
voting, involve not only underlying instrumental questions of political power 
but also the deeper question of who can legitimately shape that power.  It is 
precisely the resistance of so many white voters to Black voting power, the 
prerogative of equals, that renders the boundaries of Black franchise an 
intense battleground and lends racially based voter suppression its sense of 
betrayal and humiliation.238 
It would be myopic to ignore that the freedom of Black voting has changed 
by leaps and bounds in our history.239  But, periods of advancement have 
often been followed by retrenchment of white power and political 
resistance.240  What is clear is that the Black franchise has been an 
inescapable arena of contestation that implicates not only Black political 
power but also equality and full citizenship.  To the extent this battleground 
exists, there will always be denials and violent rejections of Black political 
equality seeping into our politics. 
CONCLUSION 
Such considerations lead us back to the global concern with which we 
started.  Why should we believe that changing another set of laws would 
meaningfully end the undermining of Black votes and the attack on Black 
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citizenship?  After all, we have canvassed how an unimaginably bloody Civil 
War and a set of constitutional amendments could not overcome the 
deep-seated belief in Black inferiority and illegitimacy.241  Thus, the same 
problems we have now—attacks on the legitimacy of Black votes and the 
political power of Black cities—can reproduce themselves under a system of 
compulsory voting.  Curing the electoral veneer does not cure the motivating 
racism which can infect any system.242 
Our history carries much warning, and this deep worry, undoubtedly, 
carries much weight.  Yet, three related responses give reason to persevere.  
First, just as our history has taught us about the reliance and adaptability of 
racism, it also has taught us about the ability of the dedicated and the brave 
to effectuate political change.  I have carefully noted how the contestation of 
the Black vote survived the Civil War, Reconstruction, Jim Crow, and the 
VRA.243  But, it would be lunacy to allow our sharp gaze on what remains to 
be done to blind us to all that has been accomplished.  The heady election 
coverage of President Biden’s resurrection, powered by South Carolina’s 
Black voters and the breathless coverage of demographic shifts moving 
election results, is a testimony to generations of legal progress toward 
securing the vote.244 
Of course, none of this occurred in the realm of politics alone.  But, that 
merely brings us to the second point.  Too sharply cleaving the issue into a 
legal problem and a racism problem ignores the deeply important ways laws 
influence norms.245  I do not question that women are my professional and 
personal equals (or bosses!) because of the vast economic and social changes 
advanced by preceding generations.  But, those changes were, too, partially 
structured by laws prohibiting discrimination and sexual harassment in the 
workplace, marketplace, and so on.246  The world of “Mad Men” is not only 
socially untenable but also legally impermissible.  So, too, a regime of 
compulsory voting would slowly, but powerfully, change the way America 
relates to voting in general and, in particular, to minority voting.  
Analogously to how many men now think of some behaviors as foreclosed 
in the workplace, we should not underestimate that, over time, many people 
could grow to find questioning why people voted peculiar . . . and 
questioning why Black people voted, thus, foreclosed. 
But, lastly, even granting the power of the objection does not dissuade me.  
If the objection is that compulsory voting cannot end the racism that infects 
so much of American life, then, surely, I can admit that is true.  But, as with 
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each important legal step that has come before, a compulsory voting regime 
can move the ball forward on the racial undermining of democratic 
citizenship.  Just as I am grateful for those who marched to secure what 
tincture of democratic virtue we currently hold, so, too, we owe the next 
generation what progress we can seize. 
Even if compulsory voting does not solve every electoral battle, it would 
be a mistake to reduce its effects to piecemeal assessments of our myriad 
electoral issues.  Compulsory voting would offer fresh ways of breaking the 
logjam over a number of current election law skirmishes.  In an ambitious 
imagination, compulsory voting could be a template for investment in other 
pro-civic educational and citizen constituting cites, from universal 
mandatory state-sponsored jury duty247 to the periodically debated national 
service requirement.  More importantly, it would reorient our collective 
assumptions about voting from suspicion over which votes are authentic to 
the duty to collect all votes. 
A generation of Americans could grow up internalizing that everyone is 
supposed to vote, rather than buying into the inculcated idea that “some 
votes” are the product of unworthy voters, or that too many such votes were 
cast due to illegitimate manipulation.  Most importantly, historic battle lines, 
which always return to the undermining of Black voting as a rightful 
expression of an equal citizen, would simply be foreclosed.  And, with it, a 
painful and persistent method of rejecting Black Americans as being full 
members of our shared political community, healed. 
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